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The ex post analysis of inflation target fulfilment plays an important role in an inflation 
targeting framework. The major benefits of ex post analysis are threefold. First, it might 
improve the forecast accuracy. Second, it helps central bank staff and board members to 
understand the capabilities and limitations of the forecasts used in their decision-making. 
Third, it enhances monetary policy transparency and credibility. The primary aim of this 
paper is to propose a methodological framework for inflation target fulfilment assessment 
based on partial simulations, as applied in the Czech National Bank. In order to 
demonstrate the applicability of this framework we analyse the performance of the Czech 
National Bank between 2002 and 2006. We show that a large part of the inflation target 
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Nontechnical Summary 
During the last two decades, significant progress has been achieved in central bank transparency. 
Many central banks have adopted an inflation targeting framework, which allows the public to 
easily assess monetary policy performance. In this paper, we focus on this particular aspect of 
inflation targeting – inflation target fulfilment assessment. We argue in favour of the regular 
preparation and publication of such analyses of a central bank’s performance.  
Our survey among 19 OECD countries shows that the majority of central banks with an explicit 
inflation target provide the public with detailed ex post analyses of inflation target fulfilment, on 
either a regular or irregular basis. However, some central banks in our sample still do not even 
compare the inflation outcomes with the target. 
We describe a possible approach to identifying the reasons underlying inflation target hits/misses 
based on partial simulations of a reduced-form model. We distinguish between models with 
endogenous and exogenous monetary policy and propose procedures for quantifying the 
contribution of the risk assessment to the outcome. The procedure with endogenous monetary 
policy is applied to the Czech National Bank’s forecasts between 2002 and 2005. 
In this period, the inflation forecasts and interest rate forecasts were biased upwards and inflation 
was below the target most of the time. A detailed assessment of the inflation target fulfilment 
reveals that a large part of the bias in the forecasts can be assigned to bias in the variables 
describing external developments and that some short-lived deviations of interest rates from the 
model recommendation can be explained by the board’s risk assessment of the forecasts. 
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1. Introduction 
Central banks are increasingly focusing their efforts on improving the transparency of monetary 
policy. This trend is reflected by a growing number of central banks that explicitly announce their 
quantitative inflation targets, notwithstanding whether they call themselves inflation targeters or 
not. The existence of an explicit target allows a central bank to analyse monetary policy 
performance. For example, Svensson (1997a) notes that: “...a specified quantitative target 
...provides an ex post measurement of monetary policy performance, namely inflation realised 
relative to the inflation target”.  
However, a fear of going too far with transparency has emerged as central banks have progressed 
in putting the theoretical recommendations into everyday practice. Some economists (Jensen, 
2002, and Mishkin, 2004) argue that transparency has its own limits and that full transparency is 
less than optimal. In their opinion, recognition and public announcements of central bank 
mistakes might cast doubt on the future success of the central bank and decrease public 
confidence in the future fulfilment of the target. Alternatively, it is argued that too much 
transparency in general may bring too much attention to the central bank’s signals and crowd out 
the signals from the private sector (see Morris and Shin, 2002). Higher transparency then 
increases rather than decreases the economy’s sensitivity to external shocks. On the other hand, 
some economists argue in favour of full transparency (e.g. Blinder, 1998, and Chortareas, 
Stasavage and Sterne, 2002). 
This paper starts in section 2 with a discussion of the benefits of preparing and publishing 
assessments of target fulfilment. Section 3 provides the reader with a detailed overview of current 
practices in evaluating target fulfilment in selected “targeting” central banks. In section 4 we 
propose a methodological framework for decomposing the deviation of inflation from the target 
into underlying economic factors, based on partial simulations. Section 5 summarises the 
historical experience of the Czech National Bank with this particular approach to inflation target 
assessment. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Why Produce and Disclose Assessments? 
The ex post analysis of target fulfilment plays an important role in any monetary policy 
framework based on an explicit target. The major benefits of ex post analysis of inflation target 
fulfilment are threefold. First, it provides a central bank with a useful tool for regularly checking 
model accuracy and lack of bias. Second, it strengthens the knowledge among staff and board 
members of shock transmission in the economy as described by the modelling apparatus. Third, 
the publication of a sound analysis of target misses/fulfilment can enhance monetary policy 
transparency and credibility. 
The assessment of target fulfilment disaggregates an overall forecast error into separate groups of 
factors (exogenous, endogenous, factors under the direct influence of monetary policy) or even 
into particular factors (e.g. oil prices, the output gap, interest rates). Such a detailed 
decomposition creates a solid basis for regular discussion of the functioning of the transmission 
mechanism and of potential adjustments to the modelling apparatus. The checking role of the 
assessment is supported by the fact that target fulfilment is usually assessed on the basis of a 
forecast prepared some time earlier, usually equal to the lag between a change in monetary policy 4   Jan Filáček   
 
and its impact on the targeted variable. This period is commonly longer than one year, so the 
assessment of the forecast is performed a significant time later, which allows the observer to 
abstract from the currently prevailing view of the economy and to assess the forecast from a far-
sighted perspective. 
Since any model is only a rough (usually linear) approximation of the true behaviour of the 
economy
1 and since the observed data are usually random realisations of the true underlying 
process, the assessment always reveals some inaccuracy of the model. Due to randomness in data, 
it is not possible to judge model accuracy on the basis of a single assessment or a short series of 
assessments. Only a large number of assessments can provide some clue about model accuracy 
and unbiasedness. This leads to the practical problem of how long and how extensive the target-
missing evidence must be before one can take a decision to adjust the modelling techniques. Even 
if a forecast assessment is prepared every quarter, it can take years to realise the inaccuracy or 
bias of the modelling apparatus. Despite the existing implementation problems it is reasonable to 
argue that regularity and recentness in the forecast assessment might provide a safety-fuse against 
divergence of the forecast from reality. As Nymoen (2005) points out, “...not doing serious 
empirical work on model specification and evaluation is a certain recipe for forecast failure”. In 
this respect it can also be argued that a focus on one single forecast in the case of regular 
assessments allows a much deeper analysis of the forecast error than a time-to-time analysis 
covering a large number of forecasts. 
Another benefit of the assessment is a further improvement in knowledge of the modelling 
apparatus and its properties and behaviour among staff and board members. The ex post view of 
economic developments contained in the target fulfilment analysis differs from the ex ante view 
contained in the actual forecast. Whereas the ex ante view gives us a coherent story of future 
economic developments based on pure model logic, the ex post view is usually quite far from 
providing a clear-cut story of past developments. Confronting the forecast with real historical data 
yields – on the surface – many inconsistencies and hard-to-interpret developments. For example, 
in spite of a more expansionary monetary policy, lower inflationary pressures might arise. 
Interpreting such situations is much more challenging than describing a new forecast and includes 
dealing with many linked relevant issues such as data revisions and forecasting technique 
modifications. 
Last but not least, a sound analysis of target misses/fulfilment can, if published, enhance monetary 
policy transparency and credibility. Missing the target is usually perceived as a failure of the 
central bank, even though some targeters intentionally miss targets under certain circumstances
2. 
If a central bank dissembles the miss, it risks being attacked by the public and undermining faith 
in future target fulfilment. On the contrary, if a central bank provides the public with the 
reasoning for the miss, it might successfully explain part or even all of the deviation from the 
target and preserve its credibility. Even if the whole deviation were ascribed to inappropriate 
monetary policy, the public announcement of such a finding accompanied by self-reflection might 
result in better monetary policy conduct in the future and sustained public confidence in the target. 
                                                           
1 Using Clements and Hendry’s (1999) classification we presume that the forecasting model coincides with the 
true underlying process, except for stochastic errors, but the estimate of the model parameters might be subject to 
structural changes in the economy. 
2 In the case of inflation targeting, such a regime is called flexible inflation targeting (see Svensson, 1997b) Why and How to Assess Inflation Target Fulfilment   5 
 
There are further arguments for disclosing the analysis. Public disclosure reveals the central 
bank’s ability for self-reflection and its willingness to learn from its past mistakes. Nobody is 
perfect, and that includes the central bank, so no one expects it to produce 100% successful 
forecasts and make the right decisions all the time. No central bank can avoid making mistakes, 
and these mistakes are difficult to hide from the public, since anybody can compare the economic 
outcome with the target. If mistakes are not discussed by the bank, they will be discussed by 
journalists and analysts using simple methods and usually with less precise and – for the bank – 
less favourable conclusions. 
Also, almost every central bank is politically independent and therefore faces the dilemma of 
limited accountability. Some central banks address this problem by sending an open letter to the 
government or political representatives when a target is missed, explaining the reasons for the 
miss and its intended monetary policy measures.
3 But this approach has several weak points. First, 
the quantification of price stability, as expressed by the inflation target, is only indicative and 
should not be used for differentiating between right and wrong monetary policy. It is not obvious 
why, for example, 1% inflation lying at the lower boundary of a hypothetical target band should 
be considered a success while 0.9% inflation lying below the boundary should be considered a 
failure. In the same vein, the target might sometimes be met despite the wrong monetary policy, 
just because of a lucky coincidence with an external shock. Second, and more importantly, a 
central bank operating in a flexible targeting framework may in some situations intentionally 
conduct a policy of missing the target (by applying so called “escape clauses”). Then, missing the 
target is a sign of correct monetary policy, not the opposite. A regularly published analysis of 
target fulfilment avoids these shortcomings, since it is prepared regardless of the actual outcome 
and contains a detailed analysis of monetary policy aims and measures and their impacts. Having 
such thorough information available, the public has a chance of understanding the reasons behind 
the target hit/miss and of evaluating the role of the central bank’s measures in the outcome. This 
can significantly increase the central bank’s accountability to the public. 
Finally, publishing the analysis may further enhance public knowledge of the target and the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism, and especially knowledge of the transmission lag 
between a central bank measure and its biggest impact on the economy. Hence, the educational 
effect of target fulfilment assessment disclosure might be similar to the educational effect of 
forecast disclosure. 
The empirical evidence supports this line of reasoning. For example, Eijffinger and Geraats 
(2002) include public evaluation of target fulfilment in the operational transparency component of 
their transparency index
4. A subsequent study by Demertzis and Hallett (2002) used the 
Eijffinger-Geraats index to estimate the impact of transparency on inflation and output variability. 
One of their conclusions
5 is that operational transparency, including target fulfilment assessment, 
significantly reduced inflation variability. 
 
                                                           
3 This procedure is established, for example, in the Bank of England and the Central Bank of Iceland. 
4 From the sample of nine major central banks, only Sveriges Riksbank received a full score in this transparency 
aspect. 
5 They also found that higher operational transparency increases output variability. This is probably due to the 
greater emphasis of a transparent central bank on the primary target, and is fully in line with Jensen’s (2002) 
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3 Survey of Current Target Fulfilment Assessment Practices 
In this section we provide an overview of how selected central banks assess target hits/misses and 
whether central banks publicly disclose their assessments. The countries in our selection are 
OECD countries with an explicit target. Out of the 19 OECD members with an independent 
monetary policy framework
6, 17 have an explicit target and 2 (Japan and the U.S.) conduct 
monetary policy without any explicit target. With the exception of Danmarks Nationalbank, which 
has a fixed exchange rate regime against the euro, all central banks with an explicit target focus on 
inflation. In the rest of this section we describe the assessment of target hits/misses in the 16 
countries with central banks that explicitly target inflation, namely at the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, the Bank of Canada, the Czech National Bank, the European Central Bank
7, the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank, the Central Bank of Iceland, the Bank of Korea, the Banco de México, the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, the Norges Bank, the National Bank of Poland, the Národná Banka 
Slovenska, the Sveriges Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank, the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey and the Bank of England. 
First we searched the central banks’ websites for publicly available documents on the issue of 
target fulfilment and analysed whether these documents describe, in detail, the factors underlying 
target (non)fulfilment and whether they explicitly contain an evaluation of the monetary policy 
contribution. Second, we sent a questionnaire to each central bank in the sample asking it to reveal 
its internal target fulfilment assessment procedures. Subsequently, we compared these two sets of 
information and analysed how much the internal documents differ from the officially published 
documents.  
Despite the declared transparency of central banks operating inflation targeting regimes, and 
despite the key role of inflation target fulfilment in building a credibility record, not every central 
bank in our sample (as of summer 2006) provides a public analysis of target fulfilment or 
mentions the role of central bank policy in the outcome (see Table 1).  
Four central banks in the sample do not regularly and explicitly compare inflation outcomes with 
their inflation target (we consider a joint presentation of actual inflation and the inflation target in 
a single paragraph, table or chart to be an explicit comparison) or, in the case of the European 
Central Bank, with its definition of price stability. In the case of the Narodná Banka Slovenska, 
the absence of a comparison probably stems from the short history of inflation targeting, which 
was adopted in December 2004 with the first target set for December 2005. Aside from these four, 
the central banks compare inflation with the target verbally, graphically or numerically. In a 
majority of banks, this comparison is published both in their core annual (Annual Report) and 
quarterly (Inflation Report, Monthly Bulletin, etc.) publications. 
 
                                                           
6 OECD countries which are members of the euro area are treated in this paper as a single country.  
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Table 1: Publicly Disclosed Analysis of Inflation Target Fulfilment 
Country Central bank Explicit comparison of 
inflation with target
Analysis of underlying 
factors in the outcome
Explicit role of monetary 
policy in the outcome
Australia Reserve Bank of Australia no yes (SMP) no
Canada Bank of Canada yes (MPR+AR) yes (MPR+AR) yes (AR)
Czech Republic Czech National Bank yes (IR+AR) yes (IR+AR) yes (IR)
Euro area European Central Bank no yes (MB) no
Hungary Magyar Nemzeti Bank yes (IR+AR) yes (AR) yes (AR)
Iceland Central Bank of Iceland yes (MB+AR) yes (MB+AR) yes
a)
Korea Bank of Korea yes (MPR+AR) yes (MPR+AR) no
Mexico Banco de México yes (IR) yes (IR) no
New Zealand Reserve Bank of New Zealand yes (MPS+AR) yes (MPS) no
b)
Norway Norges Bank yes (MPR+AR) yes (MPR
c)+AR) yes (MPR
c)+AR)
Poland National Bank of Poland yes (IR+AR) yes (IR+AR) yes (IR)
Slovak Republic Národná Banka Slovenska no no no




Switzerland Swiss National Bank no no no
Turkey Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey yes (AR) yes (AR) no




Source: Central banks’ websites, author’s survey. 
Note:  a) If inflation moves beyond the tolerance limit (currently ± 1.5 percentage point), the Central 
Bank of Iceland is obliged to send a report to the government explaining the reasons for the 
deviation from the target.   
  b) role of monetary policy mentioned occassionally (i.e. Drew and Orr (1999)).  
  c) published annually in spring issue of Economic Bulletin and February/March issue of MPR 
  d) annually in first MPR issue. 
  e) If inflation moves away from the target by more than 1 percentage point, the Governor of the 
Bank is obliged to write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining why the target was missed. 
  Abbreviations: AR=Annual Report, IR=Inflation Report/Report on Inflation, MB=Monthly 
Bulletin/Monetary Bulletin, MPR=Monetary Policy Report, MPS= Monetary Policy Statement, 
SMP=Statement on Monetary Policy. 
 
Table 1 shows that if a central bank decides to compare actual inflation with the target, it also 
provides an analysis of the factors underlying the inflation outcome. A strong tendency seems to 
exist among the banks to explain deviations from the target, if such a deviation is revealed. This 
finding is intuitive, since a detailed explanation allows the bank to sustain the credibility of the 
inflation target by blaming the deviation from the target fully or partially on factors that lie 
outside monetary policy control. A specific procedure exists in the Bank of England, which only 
provides a public explanation of the deviation from the target when inflation deviates from the 
target range by more than 1 percentage point. The first (and so far only) letter was sent in April 
2007.  
Interestingly, after we exclude the Bank of England, only six banks in our sample provide a full 
description of the factors behind target hits/misses, including a discussion of the monetary policy 
contribution. These are: the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Czech National Bank, the 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the Norges Bank, the National Bank of Poland and the Sveriges Riksbank. 
Surprisingly, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, despite its high degree of monetary policy 
transparency, does not include an explicit discussion of the monetary policy contribution to target 
fulfilment in its regular publications.  
For some central banks, the cons of revealing the target fulfilment assessment to the public might 
exceed the pros. It is then reasonable to conduct the assessment for internal purposes only. In that 
case, it is hard for outsiders to find out whether such an analysis is conducted and what the main 
sources of target (non)fulfilment are.  8   Jan Filáček   
 
To unveil the internal assessment procedures, we sent out a questionnaire to the central banks in 
our sample, asking them to reveal their internal target fulfilment assessment procedures. Eleven 
out of the 16 central banks responded (a response rate of 69%)
8. Given the confidentiality of the 
survey answers we will hereafter only discuss a summary of the main findings from the survey, 
without citing any particular banks. 
Surprisingly, out of the 11 banks which sent back the questionnaire, only two claim that they do 
not disclose the target fulfilment analysis to the public in full. Notably, these two banks use 
sophisticated modelling techniques for decomposing the overall deviation from the inflation target 
into its separate underlying factors. These banks do not publish all the technical details of the 
computation or the exact results of the simulations, but do provide a verbal description of the 
main results, primarily for the sake of clarity.  
If evaluated, the contribution of central bank monetary policy to target fulfilment is disclosed to 
the public. However, it must be said that the publicly disclosed evaluation of past monetary policy 
is usually written in a rather general manner, without any explicit judgement of the soundness of 
past monetary policy. 
Roughly half of the responding central banks employ a modelling technique in their target 
fulfilment assessments, while the other half rely rather on expert judgement. If a macroeconomic 
model is used in the assessment, in most cases it is the core model used for building the central 
bank forecast. The main advantages of applying the same model for both tasks are consistency of 
the assessment with the forecast and the possibility of using the results of the assessment 
immediately for improving the forecast. Indeed, all the banks which use the same modelling 
technique for both assessment and forecasting use the results of the assessment as feedback into 
the forecast, and whenever the assessment reveals a systematic bias a review of the model 
assumptions is initiated. 
On the other hand, the close link between the forecast and the assessment implies that the same 
staff usually prepare both the target fulfilment assessment and the forecast. This is the case in the 
majority of the central banks in our sample, and especially in those which use sophisticated 
modelling techniques. Consequently, incentives to perform some “prejudiced” window dressing 
might emerge. For example, the staff may either intentionally or unintentionally distort the 
analysis in such a manner as to undervalue the forecast error (for example, by attributing a target 
miss primarily to vis major, i.e. external developments). But there are ways of reducing this 
problem. For example, a rewards scheme based on improvements in forecast accuracy (not on 
forecast accuracy itself) can be implemented. 
                                                           
8 Here I would like to thank all the respondents for valuable feedback, namely: Michal Brzoza-Brzezina from the 
National Bank of Poland, Philippine Cour-Thimann from the European Central Bank, Guy Debelle from the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, Gill Hammond from the Bank of England, Per Jansson from the Sveriges Riksbank, 
Per Espen Lilleås from the Bank of Norway, Sharon McCaw from the Bank of New Zealand, John Murray from 
the Bank of Canada, Thorarinn Petursson from the Central Bank of Iceland and Ernesto Sepulveda-Villarreal 
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4. How to Assess Target Fulfilment 
In this section we describe the target fulfilment evaluation methodology applied in the CNB. This 
methodology is based on partial simulations of a core macroeconomic model. The CNB’s core 
model is a New Keynesian model with forward-looking expectations and endogenous monetary 
policy. More details on the CNB’s model can be found in Coats, Laxton and Rose (2003). 
The use of a model with a monetary policy reaction function provides a consistent framework 
which accounts for active monetary policy. On the other hand it makes the analysis more difficult. 
If monetary policy reacts to exogenous shocks, the inflation forecast stays near the inflation target 
in the longer term regardless of the deviations in other variables. This prohibits us from simulating 
the impact of a deviation in one variable on inflation, because all simulations end up with inflation 
on target. However, the effect of different assumptions can be seen in the monetary policy 
instrument – interest rates. There are two plausible ways of dealing with this complication. 
We can “switch off” the reaction function and keep interest rates fixed for some period of time. 
With such a passive policy, the effect of a deviation in a given variable on inflation is not offset 
by a central bank reaction. Alternatively, we can simply evaluate the impact of a deviation in a 
given variable on the interest rate trajectory instead of its impact on inflation. Since either 
approach has its shortcomings we analyse both of them in the following text, starting with a 
transitory switching off of the reaction function. 
In both approaches, the purpose of the simulations is to explain the difference between actual 
inflation and the inflation target: 
target
t t π π −   (1) 
 
where  t π stands for actual inflation and 
target
t π  for the inflation target
9. In a flexible targeting 
framework, the central bank does not have to fully offset the inflationary impact of an economic 
shock. Hence, part of the difference (1) can be explained either by calling escape clauses into 
effect or by smoothing the interest rate trajectory. Both explanations should have already been 
incorporated into the central bank forecast, decided n-time periods ago, when the central bank was 
influencing inflation at time t: 
_ (, )
target escape clauses smoothing
tt tt n t t nt n EE x E i r ππ π π ε ε −− − −= − + +   (2) 
 
where  t n t E π − stands for the inflation forecast, made n-time periods ago, a time horizon 
corresponding to the monetary policy transmission lag. x denotes exogenous variables (input 
variables from the model perspective), ir interest rates and the n t E − operator their expected 
behaviour. 
clauses escape_ ε  specifies intentional missing of the target as ex ante explained by escape 
clauses and 
smoothing ε  as intentional missing of the target as explained by interest rate smoothing. 
The values of 
clauses escape_ ε and 
smoothing ε  are known at the time the forecast is made and equation 
                                                           
9 Here we assume that the inflation target is either a point target or a range target with a midpoint. If the target is 
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(2) should always hold for consistency reasons. This becomes evident when we subtract actual 
inflation from both sides of equation (2) and rewrite: 
target
t n t n t t n t
smoothing clauses escape ir E x E E π π ε ε − = + − − − ) , (
_   (2') 
 
We can analyse these two target miss factors in more depth either jointly or separately. If we opt 
for a separate analysis, we can obtain the contribution of the application of the escape clause by 
running the simulation with the assumption that the central bank reacts to overall inflation and not 
to a part of it, as in the case of escape clause application. The contribution of smoothing is then 
easily obtained as the complement. 
Having described the intentional target miss, we can go further and break down the right-hand 
side of equation (2) unexplained by escape clauses and smoothing as follows:  
ge model_chan
n t n t t n t t n t n t t n t t ir E x E E ir E x E E ε π π π π + − = − − − − − − − ) , ( ) , (
'   (3) 
 
where  ) , (
' ir E x E E n t n t t n t − − − π stands for the inflation forecast, as if it were made at time t-n using 
the latest model specification, i.e. using today’s knowledge of the functioning of the economy, but 
with the original forecast’s assumptions regarding exogenous variables and nominal interest rates. 
Equation (3) then compares the target miss using the historical model specification and the target 
miss when the latest model specification is applied. 
ge model_chan ε stands for the part of the target 
miss explained by changes in the model specification and improvements in the understanding of 
the economy since the original forecast was formulated.  
Again, equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
) , ( ) , (
' ir E x E E ir E x E E n t n t t n t n t n t t n t
ge model_chan
− − − − − − − = π π ε   (3') 
The right-hand side of equation (3) unexplained by model specification improvement can be 
further decomposed into: 
exogenous
n t t n t t n t n t t n t t ir E x E ir E x E E ε π π π π + − = − − − − − − ) , ( ) , (
' '   (4) 
 
where x denotes the actual development of the exogenous variables in the model and 
exogenous ε  the 
part of the target miss assigned to the deviation of actual exogenous variables from the original 
assumptions of the forecast. Again, for the purposes of better visualisation we rewrite equation (4) 
as: 
) , ( ) , (
' ' ir E x E E ir E x E n t n t t n t n t t n t
exogenous
− − − − − − = π π ε   (4') 
 
The simulation  ) , (
' ir E x E n t t n t − − π  is done using the present model specification, the actual 
exogenous variables and the original interest rate trajectory.  
Subsequently, the right-hand side of equation (4) unexplained by the deviation of actual 
exogenous variables from the assumptions can be rewritten as: Why and How to Assess Inflation Target Fulfilment   11 
 
olicy monetary_p
t n t t n t t n t t ir x E ir E x E ε π π π π + − = − − − − ) , ( ) , (
' '   (5) 
 
where ir stands for the actual development of interest rates and 
policy monetary _ ε  for the part of the 
target miss explained by the deviation of actual interest rates from the original recommendation of 
the model. Rewriting equation (5) we get: 
) , ( ) , (
' ' ir E x E ir x E n t t n t t n t
olicy monetary_p
− − − − = π π ε   (5') 
 
The simulation  ) , (
' ir x E t n t π −  is obtained by running the simulation with the latest model 
specification, the actual exogenous variables and the actual interest rate. 
Finally, the right-hand side of equation (5) unexplained by the deviation of actual interest rates 
from the assumptions is labelled as the model inaccuracy: 
) , (
' ir x E t n t t
curacy model_inac π π ε − − =   (6) 
 
More precisely,
curacy model_inac ε  is the part of the target miss unexplained by the previous 
simulations. This term captures the inaccuracy of the present model, the inaccuracy of the 
simulations and the inaccuracy of the data. 
It must be said that the approach of partial simulations presented here is conditional on several 
simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the historical data, as published, for example, by 
the statistics office, are perfect measures of reality. Second, we treat historically observed shocks 
as expected in the simulations. Third, we consider the latest version of the model to be the best 
available description of reality. We should carefully bear these assumptions in mind, especially 
when interpreting the last part of the target miss as defined by equation (6).  
Solving equations (2) to (6) we get: 
curacy model_inac ge model_chan target ε ε ε ε ε ε π π + + + + + = −
policy monetary exogenous smoothing clauses escape
t t
_ _   (7) 
 
While the first two terms on the right-hand side describe the intentional missing of the target, the 
remaining terms should be considered as the unintentional missing of the target. The aim of the 
central bank should be to minimise the extent of the unintentional missing of the target, i.e. the 
values of 
ge model_chan ε ,
exogenous ε ,
policy monetary_ ε  and 
curacy model_inac ε .  
Some central banks, including the CNB, when forecasting exogenous variables mechanically 
draw on the consensus forecasts of independent economists. In that case, the central bank is not 
directly responsible for the 
exogenous ε  term, and the forecasting team should only be held 
responsible for 
ge model_chan ε  and 
curacy model_inac ε . 
ge model_chan ε  is the disclosed part of the model 
inaccuracy, while 
curacy model_inac ε  is the undisclosed part. It is reasonable to assume that the 
forecasting team gradually improves its forecasting techniques, so non-zero values of 
ge model_chan ε consequently reduce the values of 
curacy model_inac ε . If the forecast is based on internally 
made assumptions regarding exogenous variables, the forecasting team should also be responsible 
for the value of 
exogenous ε . 12   Jan Filáček   
 
It is the role of the decision-making body of the central bank (the monetary policy committee, the 
bank board) to identify the risks of the forecast and to choose the 
policy monetary _ ε  that offsets the 
inaccuracy of the forecast and minimises the overall sum of 
ge model_chan ε , 
exogenous ε , 
policy monetary _ ε  
and 
curacy model_inac ε , i.e. the future unintentional deviation of inflation from the target. In the ideal 
case, the decision-making body should fully compensate for the forecast inaccuracy: 
) (
_ curacy model_inac ge model_chan ε ε ε ε + + − =
exogenous policy monetary   (8) 
  
However, equation (8) does not hold if the decision maker has changed the perception of optimal 
interest rate smoothing or the perception and application of escape clauses since the original 
forecast was completed. To differentiate between the effect of risk assessment and the effects of 
changes in monetary policy behaviour, one must carefully read the minutes of the decision-
making body’s meetings and identify the overall risk assessment. 
A similar approach can be adopted in central banks that use, in their decision-making, models 
with exogenous monetary policy, which are based on the assumption of unchanged interest rates 
or interest rates fixed on a predefined trajectory
10. Assuming fixed interest rates, the forecast is 
usually outside the inflation target at the monetary policy horizon. Writing from an ex post 
perspective: 
fixed_ir
n t t n t t
target
t t x E ir E ε π π π π + − = − − − ) , (   (9) 
 
where  ) , ( x E ir E n t t n t − − π stands for the inflation forecast, based on the assumption of interest rates 
fixed on a predefined trajectory ir , and 
fixed_ir ε  stands for the divergence of the forecast from the 
target caused by non-reactive monetary policy. In this case, the monetary authority must decide 
not only on the bias in the inflation forecast caused by model inaccuracy and by the evolution of 
exogenous variables, but also on the bias in the forecast caused by adhering to the assumption of 
fixed interest rates, 
fixed_ir ε : 
 
) (
_ curacy model_inac ge model_chan ε ε ε ε ε + + + − =
exogenous fixed_ir policy monetary   (10) 
 
The aforementioned target assessment procedure with a temporarily switched-off reaction 
function or with exogenous monetary policy is rather tricky. Besides being vulnerable to the 
Lucas critique
11, exogenising the interest rate trajectory brings additional complications to our 
analysis. It is obvious that the economy will diverge from a reasonable path without the stabilising 
effect of monetary policy. As a consequence, some simulations might result in large deviations 
from the steady state and might be difficult to interpret. These arguments lead us to recommend 
the use of a model with endogenous monetary policy and a target fulfilment analysis based on 
simulations with a switched-on reaction function. In this approach, the impact of each factor on 
target fulfilment is derived from a comparison of the implied interest rates. 
                                                           
10 For example, the forecasts of the Bank of England and the ECB are based on interest rate trajectories derived 
from market yield curves. 
11 In fact we use a different model with the same coefficient values. Why and How to Assess Inflation Target Fulfilment   13 
 
Following the same logic as in equations (2)–(6) in the previous approach, we can break down the 
difference between actual interest rates and interest rates consistent with target fulfilment in the 
following way: 
smoothing clauses escape
n t n t n t n t x E ir E ir x E ir E ir η η + + − = − − − − −
_ ) ( ) (
in_target inflation_   (11) 
or, if rewritten: 
) ( ) (
_ x E ir E x E ir E n t n t n t n t
smoothing clauses escape
− − − − − = +
in_target inflation_ η η   (11') 
 
where ir denotes the actual development of interest rates, and  ) ( x E ir E n t n t − −
in_target inflation_  refers to 
the interest rate trajectory which will keep inflation on target, given the expected development of 
exogenous variables x. Similarly to (2), we can break down the first two components of the right-
hand side of equation (11) unexplained by escape clauses and smoothing as follows: 
 
ge model_chan η + − = − − − − − ) ( ) (
' x E ir E ir x E ir E ir n t n t n t n t   (12) 
or: 
) ( ) (
' x E ir E x E ir E n t n t n t n t − − − − − =
ge model_chan η   (12') 
 
Further breakdown will disclose the impact of the deviation of the actual exogenous variables 
from the original assumptions of the forecast: 
exogenous
n t n t n t x ir E ir x E ir E ir η + − = − − − − ) ( ) (
' '   (13) 
or: 
) ( ) (
' ' x E ir E x ir E n t n t n t
exogenous
− − − − = η   (13') 
 
And finally, the right-hand side of equation (13) unexplained by the deviation of the actual 
exogenous variables from the original assumptions of the forecast is labelled the model 
inaccuracy: 
) (
' x ir E ir n t
curacy model_inac
− − = η   (14) 
 
In contrast to (6), the model inaccuracy term in equation (14) also contains the inaccuracy in 
forecasting the monetary policy reaction, which is not treated separately from the other 
endogenous variables in the simulations with a switched-on reaction function. 14   Jan Filáček   
 
It is easily seen that the sum of the error terms in equations (11)–(14) is equal to the total 
deviation of actual interest rates from the trajectory consistent with target fulfilment: 
curacy model_inac ge model_chan in_target inflation_ η η η η η + + + + = − − −
exogenous smoothing clauses escape
n t n t x E ir E ir
_ ) ( (15) 
 
The main shortcoming of the approach based upon a switched-on reaction function is that it is 
impossible to determine the extent to which the decision-making body anticipated the model 
inaccuracy and the contribution of the risk assessment to the inflation outcome. Another problem 
stems from the necessity to analyse the whole trajectory of interest rates from period t-n to 
period t (mainly due to interest rate smoothing, which melts the central bank reaction into several 
quarters).  
In section 5, we show an example of target fulfilment assessment based on the switched-on 
reaction function approach, as applied in the Czech National Bank.  
5. Example of Target Fulfilment Assessment – The CNB’s Historical 
Record 
The Czech National Bank started assessing inflation target fulfilment with the introduction of 
inflation targeting in 1998. Until 2001, targets were only set for the year-end and the inflation 
target fulfilment assessment was performed on an annual basis and published each year in the 
January Inflation Report. In 2002 a continuous target was introduced, and since then the inflation 
target assessment has been an integral part of every issue of the Inflation Report (section II.2 of 
the Report).  
Until July 2002, the CNB forecast was based on the assumption of constant interest rates and 
expert judgement played a key role in shaping the forecast. As a consequence, the inflation target 
fulfilment assessment was mostly judgemental until the third quarter of 2003 (the October 2003 
Inflation Report).
12 Starting from the January 2004 Inflation Report, the regular assessment stands 
upon simulations of a model with endogenous monetary policy. 
Eleven assessments were made between January 2004 and July 2006 using the approach described 
in section 4 with a switched-on reaction function. As previously discussed, in this approach we 
discuss interest rate residuals rather than inflation residuals. In all the assessments, the following 
effects were identified: (i) intentional missing of the target (
smoothing clauses escape η η +
_ ), (ii) the effect 
of the external environment (
exogenous η ), (iii) the effect of model change (
ge model_chan η ) and (iv) the 
effect of model inaccuracy (
curacy model_inac η ). Starting from the first quarter of 2004, the assessment 
was extended to include (v) the effect of regulated prices and changes in consumption taxes (let’s 
denote this effect by 
prices regulated_ η ), and finally, since the second quarter of 2005 the assessment 
has also included (vi) the effect of the deviation of the fiscal impulse from the original 
assumptions of the forecast (let’s denote this by 
ulse fiscal_imp η ). 
Figures 1 and 2 show the inflation and interest rate forecasts from the CNB’s model with 
endogenous monetary policy together with the actual outcomes. Although the forecasts are in 
                                                           
12 The monetary policy horizon of the CNB is between twelve and eighteen months. Why and How to Assess Inflation Target Fulfilment   15 
 
practice made for an infinite horizon, only the first six quarters – corresponding to the monetary 
policy horizon of the CNB – are depicted in the charts. Several observations can be made from 
Figure 1. First, in the majority of the forecasts actual inflation was below the forecasted values. 
Out of the eleven forecasts in the sample, three (July 2003, January 2004, January 2005) almost 
matched the ex post outcomes and one (October 2003) stood below actual inflation for much of 
the forecast. This finding is consistent with the series of negative exogenous shocks that occurred 
in the sample period (the prolonged recession in Germany, the slow pace of price deregulation, 
and the exceptionally good harvests in 2004 and 2005), whose disinflationary impact on inflation 
was only partially offset by the unexpectedly high oil prices. The second observation is that, with 
the sole exception of the April 2003 forecast, the inflation forecasts tend to return to the inflation 
target in the longer term. This reflects the nature of the forecasts with endogenous monetary 
policy, which over a sufficiently long time horizon pushes the inflation forecast close to the target. 
Only the April 2003 forecast departed significantly from this rule within the monetary policy 
horizon, because of the temporary effect of expected adjustments to consumption taxes, which 
were dealt with by applying escape clauses. 







III/2002 IV I/2003 II III IV I/2004 II III IV I/2005 II III IV I/2006 II
July 2002 October 2002 January 2003
April 2003 July 2003 October 2003
January 2004 April 2004 July 2004
October 2004 January 2005 actual inflation
target
 
Source: CNB Inflation Reports. 
 
The interest rate forecasts, presented in Figure 2, provide a similar picture. The majority of the 
forecasts exceeded the outcome in the longer term. The forecasts between July 2003 and January 
2004 break this rule, which in the case of the October 2003 forecast intuitively corresponds to the 
bias in the inflation forecast. From a policy-maker’s perspective, interest rate forecasts, as 
opposed to inflation forecasts, are the most important in the short term, as they have an immediate 
effect on decision-making. The accuracy of interest rate forecasts is significantly higher in the 
short term than in the longer term. This can be explained partially by interest rate smoothing and 
partially by self-fulfilment of the interest rate assumption. In the sample, the CNB Bank Board 
usually followed the forecast recommendation, the exceptions being October 2002, April 2003, 
October 2003 and April 2004. 16   Jan Filáček   
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Source: CNB Inflation Reports. 
 
The second observation in Figure 2, parallel to the second finding in the previous chart, is that the 
interest rate path is usually upward-sloping in the longer term. This is a result of the model 
assumption that in the sufficiently distant future interest rates will converge to their equilibrium 
values (defined as the equilibrium real interest rate plus the inflation target – approximately 5% in 
the sample) and that initial interest rates lie uniformly below their long-run equilibrium values in 
the sample period. 
The charts above may serve as a good illustration of the basic features of the CNB’s forecasts and 
as a first insight into the economic developments in the analysed period, but they cannot tell us 
which particular factor made the actual outcomes deviate from the forecast and whether the 
modelling apparatus is sufficiently accurate or not. Based on these figures, it is impossible to 
judge whether the forecasting techniques or monetary policy can be improved and, if so, in which 
direction. In order to obtain answers to these questions we provide, in the following paragraphs, 
the results of the partial simulations prepared in the sample period. 
Figures 3–8 depict the values of 
smoothing clauses escape η η +
_ , 
ge model_chan η ,
exogenous η , 
prices regulated_ η , 
ulse fiscal_imp η  and 
curacy model_inac η . As mentioned earlier, the values of 
prices regulated_ η  are available 
since the 2004 Q1 assessment and the values of 
ulse fiscal_imp η  since the 2005 Q2 assessment. 
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Figure 3: Values of 
smoothing clauses escape η η +






III/2002 IV I/2003 II III IV I/2004 II III IV I/2005 II III IV I/2006 II
July 2002 October 2002 January 2003
April 2003 July 2003 October 2003
January 2004 April 2004 July 2004
October 2004 January 2005
 
Source: CNB calculations. 
Figure 3 shows that the CNB quite often does not aim exactly at the middle of the inflation target 
at the monetary policy horizon (the situation corresponding to the zero line). Within the sample, 
three inflation forecasts (January 2003, April 2004 and July 2004) stood on the target. Consistent 
with this, the interest rate trajectory in these forecasts was the same as the interest rate trajectory 
necessary for achieving the target, i.e. the 
smoothing clauses escape η η +
_  residual was zero. In the rest of 
forecasts, either the smoothing of interest rates or ex ante escape clauses made the CNB deviate 
interest rates from the trajectory consistent with inflation target fulfilment
13. In most forecasts, 
meeting the target would have required a lower initial interest rate than the suggested baseline 
scenario (the positive residuals in Figure 3). However, after just three quarters a more aggressive 
rule pushes interest rates above the original forecast in order to compensate for the previous 
easing of monetary policy. The April 2003 forecast was the only forecast to predict that inflation 
would be above the target at the monetary policy horizon (see Figure 1). In this case, meeting the 
target would have required higher interest rates for all six quarters. 
Figure 4: Values of 






III/2002 IV I/2003 II III IV I/2004 II III IV I/2005 II III IV I/2006 II
July 2002 October 2002 January 2003
April 2003 July 2003 October 2003
January 2004 April 2004 July 2004
October 2004 January 2005
Source: CNB calculations. 
 
 
                                                           
13 Theoretically, there is an infinite number of interest rate trajectories that would lead to the inflation forecast 
being on target. In our simulations we derived the hypothetical interest rate trajectories by increasing the 
aggressiveness of the reaction function, i.e. by increasing the weight on inflation in the reaction function and, if 
necessary, also by lowering the smoothing parameter. 18   Jan Filáček   
 
Figure 4 captures the effects of changes in the model specification. Since the introduction of the 
New Keynesian model with endogenous monetary policy in summer 2002, several improvements 
have been made to the modelling techniques.
14 These changes acted in the direction of higher 
inflation and interest rates, the only exception being the October 2004 forecast assessment, based 
on the model specification as in January 2006. 
Figure 5: Values of 
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Source: CNB calculations. 
 
The effect of the external environment is depicted in Figure 5. The interest rate trajectory with ex 
post knowledge of external developments lies uniformly below the interest rate forecasts based on 
ex ante expectations until the July 2004 forecast. This reflects the disinflationary effect of the 
external environment (especially of foreign demand as represented by the German output gap) on 
the Czech economy between 2002 and 2004. However, the inflationary effects of the pronounced 
rise in oil prices in 2005 and 2006 outweighed the weak foreign demand in the October 2004 and 
January 2005 forecasts. Figure 5 shows the average highest absolute values from Figures 3–8, 
implying that external factors explain the biggest part of the deviation of inflation from the target. 
This finding clearly illustrates the vulnerability of the Czech economy to external developments. 
The effect of the deviation of regulated prices and tax adjustments from the original assumptions 
is presented in Figure 6. Although some of the forecasts in the sample predicted a significantly 
different path of administrative prices than subsequently occurred (noticeable in the April 2003 
forecast), the average deviation of the forecasts is close to zero. One should note here that these 
simulations include both the primary and secondary effects of regulated price changes (if their 
contribution to overall inflation is “normal”
15) and only the secondary effects of tax changes. The 
primary effects of tax changes and “abnormal” contributions of regulated prices to inflation are 
included in the simulation of escape clause effects. 
                                                           
14 The most important adjustments were the abandoning of the assumption of price rigidity of some items of the 
consumer basket in April 2003 and the gradual lowering of the estimated rate of equilibrium appreciation of the 
Czech crown’s exchange rate in July and October 2003 and January 2004. In the January 2005 forecast and the 
2006 forecasts the equilibrium appreciation was increased. The other changes to the model, including the break-
up of the single Phillips curve into two separate equations for food prices and core inflation in October 2002, the 
recalibration of the central bank’s reaction function in April 2003, the inclusion of the EUR/USD exchange rate 
in the import price equation in April 2004, the decomposition of equilibrium exchange rate appreciation between 
tradables and non-tradables in October 2005 and the change in the proxy for energy prices in April 2006, had a 
negligible impact on the model behaviour. 
15 The contribution of 1–1.5 percentage points to y-o-y inflation was considered to be “normal.” Why and How to Assess Inflation Target Fulfilment   19 
 
Figure 6: Values of 
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Source: CNB calculations. 
 
Figure 7: Values of 
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Source: CNB calculations. 
 
Figure 7 shows the effect of the deviation of the fiscal impulse from the original assumptions. 
Only five forecasts are depicted in this chart because this factor was not treated separately until 
the January 2004 forecast (before that it was included in the model inaccuracy effect). With this 
limited number of observations it is difficult to identify any systematic pattern. However, all the 
observations have so far been in the negative region, i.e. the CNB tended to overestimate the 
fiscal impulse in its forecasts. This might look like a sign of central bank vigilance, but the real 
reason is more prosaic. The Czech government systematically overestimated its budget deficits in 
the sample period, and the central bank’s forecasts, despite some discounting of the official 
budget plans, were influenced in the direction of higher fiscal impulses.  20   Jan Filáček   
 
Figure 8: Values of 
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Source: CNB calculations. 
 
Finally, Figure 8 captures the remaining residuals of the forecasts unexplained by the previous 
simulations. Among these, a prominent role should be assigned to the central bank reaction 
function residual, as discussed in section 4. The bank board might disagree with the forecast 
message and might assign asymmetric risks to the baseline scenario of the forecast. In the ideal 
case, this risk identification will anticipate the future deviation of the economy from the forecast, 
so the deviation of interest rates from the forecast will keep inflation in line with the forecast. 
However, the identified risks are only rarely fully realised to the anticipated extent and it would 
be useful to distinguish between ex post appropriate risk identification (corresponding to the 
model inaccuracy) and ex post inappropriate risk identification (interest changes beyond the 
model inaccuracy). But as we mentioned in section 4, this is not possible using the simulation 
with a switched-on reaction function. Hence, we have to limit our discussion of Figure 8 to the 
overall bias of the model, including the effect of risk assessment. 
Although the residuals in Figure 8 are on average balanced, three specific periods can be 
identified. For the first two forecasts, the residuals are balanced and close to zero. In the second 
period, beginning with the January 2003 forecast, the residuals lie significantly above the zero 
line, i.e. actual interest rates were higher than the model would suggest based on a perfect 
knowledge of all the relevant information. Starting from the April 2004 forecast the sign of the 
residuals turns around and becomes mostly negative. The differences between the residuals in 
these three periods might be a result of either a shift in the risk evaluation, changes in the 
forecasting techniques that were not captured in the previous simulations
16, or changes in the 
functioning of the economy.  
Whereas it is impossible in our approach to discriminate between the last two hypotheses, we can 
try to verify the first hypothesis by looking at the overall balance of the risks as recorded in the 
minutes of the decision-making meeting, and by comparing this finding with the actual settings of 
interest rates. In the first period, the risks were either slightly disinflationary (the July 2002 
forecast) or balanced (the October 2002 forecast). The risks in the second period were 
predominantly inflationary (the January 2003, October 2003 and January 2004 forecasts). The 
July 2003 forecast was assessed as balanced and the April 2003 forecast as disinflationary. On the 
                                                           
16 These can include, for example, shifts in expert judgement, which strongly affects the forecast in the nearest 
quarter. Why and How to Assess Inflation Target Fulfilment   21 
 
contrary, the risks in the third period were mostly biased in the disinflationary direction (the April 
2004, January 2005 forecasts). Balanced risks were identified for the July 2004 and October 2004 
forecasts. Based on this information we can conclude that the bias in the residuals in each specific 
period corresponds to the overall direction of the risks as identified by the board. We can 
conclude that the residuals in Figure 8 are at least partially influenced by the risk assessment of 
the forecasts. 
To sum up, our analysis based on partial simulations shows that a large part of the target misses in 
the period under review stemmed from deviation in the input variables (predominantly from the 
external environment). We also show that in the context of the model with endogenous monetary 
policy, some part of the model inaccuracy, as expressed by the deviation of actual interest rates 
from the recommendation of the model with full knowledge, can be assigned to the risk 
assessment of the board. 
6. Conclusions 
The assessment of target fulfilment is an essential part of a monetary policy framework with an 
explicit target. It prevents a central bank from producing systematically biased forecasts, deepens 
the understanding among central bank staff and board members of the capabilities and limitations 
of the forecast, and enhances monetary policy transparency and credibility. We argue in favour of 
publishing such analyses.  
Indeed, our survey shows that the majority of central banks armed with an explicit inflation target 
provide the public with detailed ex post analyses of inflation target fulfilment, on either a regular 
or irregular basis. However, some central banks still do not even compare the inflation outcomes 
with the target. 
Subsequently, we describe a possible approach to identifying the reasons underlying inflation 
target hits/misses based on partial simulations of a reduced-form model. We distinguish between 
models with endogenous and exogenous monetary policy and propose procedures for quantifying 
the contribution of the risk assessment to the outcome. The procedure with endogenous monetary 
policy is applied to the Czech National Bank’s forecasts between 2002 and 2005. 
In this period, the inflation forecasts and interest rate forecasts were biased upwards and inflation 
was below the target most of time. A detailed assessment of inflation target fulfilment reveals that 
a large part of the bias in the forecasts can be assigned to bias in variables describing external 
developments and that some short-lived deviations of interest rates from the model 
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